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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MERVIN R. REID and ETHNA R.
REID,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

vs

Case No. 17637

MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE CO.
and UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of a Lease Agreement and a
Counterclaim for constructive eviction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court sitting without jury rendered judgment
in favor of plaintiffs and dismissed Defendants' Counterclaim.
RELIEF ON AN APPEAL
Respondents, Mervin and Ethna Reid, seek affirmation of
the lower court's order granting judgment in favor of plaintiffs
and dismissing Defendants' Counterclaim and remand to the
District Court for an award of reasonable attorney's fees as
provided for in the lease agreement.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about September 15, 1980 plaintiffs entered into a
lease agreement with defendants.

Plaintiffs occupied the top

floor of the Reid Office Building and defendants, Mutual of
Omaha and United Benefit Life Insurance Company (hereinafter
referred to as

f!

Mutual of Omaha11) and Intermountain Marketing

took possession of the bottom floor simultaneously (R. 431),
Beginning in November of 1980, Mutual of Omaha, by and
through its General Manager, Hector Diaz, began complaining of
alleged problems encountered as tenants in the Reid Building (R.
441),

The alleged problems raised by defendants were concerns

which are common in the rental of any building, noise from the
adjacent tenant, improper maintenance of the common restrooms,
improper use of the common areas by the adjacent tenant, parking
problems, failure to properly remove ice and snow from the
parking lot and sidewalks, Mr. Diaz complained to the Reids
every time the restrooms were short on paper products or any
time he perceived a problem (R. 643).
Plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, listened to the
complaints of defendants and then worked to solve the alleged
problems of Mr. Diaz (R. 445, 451, 455, 456, 461-463, 465, 466,
770-776).

On several occasions Mr. and Mrs. Reid met personally

with Intermountain Marketing to attempt to alleviate any alleged
problems created by them (R. 451, 456, 465, 473, 770-776, 763)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and even caused their attorney to send a letter to Intermountain
Marketing (R. 472). In each instance, Intermountain Marketing
agreed to stop or limit practices that were being complained of
by Mr. Diaz (R. 770-776).

Intermountain Marketing even agreed

to stop the complained of noise emanating from their office
until after office hours (R. 607, 537).
Aside from the improper removal of ice and snow and the
improper maintenance of the restrooms which Mr. Diaz admits was
taken care of shortly after they entered the building, all of
the other problems complained of were created or caused by
Intermountain Marketing (R. 481). Mervin and Ethna Reid did not
cause or authorize any of the problems complained of by defendants through Mr. Diaz (R. 486, 558, 557).
By his own admission, Mr. Diaz's major concern was the
noise emanating from Intermountain Marketing (R. 555). Mr. Diaz
asserts that after June 9, 1981 he had his secretary note each
occurrence of noise from the adjacent tenants, Intermountain
Marketing (R. 560, 561). Mr. Diaz is aware of only 19 separate
occurrences, several of which were on the same date, during the
8 month period from June 1981 through February 15, 1982 (Responses to Interrogatories, R. 133-138 and Supplement Responses
210, R. 561). Mr. Diaz tape recorded these occurrences from
Mutual of Omahafs office.

Defendant selected excerpts from

these tape recordings which were played to the court (R. 540,
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541) and Mr. Diaz testified that these tape recordings were
representative of the noise that came from Intermountain Marketing (R. 539, 571).
However, other employees of defendants testified that
Mr. Diaz's concern over the noise was exaggerated (R. 717, 718).
The complained of noise consisted of applause, and laughter, as
well as a countdown from 10 to 0 followed by "I feel great11
repeated twice, followed by applause (R. 604,605).

The count-

down lasted approximately 12 seconds in duration and was referred to as a "fire-up" drill (R. 604, 605).
With regard to the alleged parking problems, Mr. Diaz
admits that he was always able to find parking in the morning
(R. 520). Also, there were always parking spaces available
under the building (R. 489).
With regard to the alleged janitorial problems, no
problems existed after talking with the Reids (R, 554, 555).
Intermountain Marketing, who used the same restrooms and common
areas, had no complaints concerning janitorial services (R.
621).
With regard to the alleged problems in hallways as well
as all other problems, these concerns were all resolved by the
Reids through talking with the tenants (R. 770-776).
Mr. Diaz cannot site any business that was lost because
of the noise or the complained of problems by Intermountain
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Marketing or by plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid (R. 583).
Moreover, Mr. Diaz admits that each year Mutual of Omaha was in
the Reid Building, they increased their production from the
previous year (R. 660-665).
Mr. Diaz told Mervin Reid that he needed more office
space and asked him if Mutual of Omaha could rent more space (R.
386, 387). The new lease procured by Mutual of Omaha provides
for approximately 20% more space than they had in the Reid
Building (Exhibit 32P).
On November 17, 1981 plaintiffs received a letter from
Mutual of Omaha's attorney, Larry Morton, stating that the noise
must cease or that they would terminate the lease (Exhibits
23d).

In response, the Reids replied with a letter of December

4, 1981 that they would hold Mutual of Omaha strictly to the
terms of the lease obligations and would not allow the lease to
be terminated (Exhibits 33P). At the end of December, defendants had not heard any further noise from Intermountain Marketing and accordingly Mutual of Omaha instructed that January's
rent should be paid (Exhibit 25D, R. 695-697).

Mervin and Ethna

Reid, likewise, heard no disturbances nor were they contacted by
Mr. Diaz regarding any other problems with noise or any other
complaints (R. 775, 776).

From January 1, 1982, Mervin and

Ethna Reid received no further complaints from either Mutual of
Omaha or Mr. Diaz regarding any problem until February 14, 1982
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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wl2hen the moving van appeared at the Reid Building and Mr. Diaz
indicated that he was leaving the leased premises (R. 487, 776).
The Reids received a letter the following day, February 15th,
indicating that Mutual of Omaha considered the lease agreement
terminated (Exhibit 2P) .
Mervin and Ethna Reid then filed suit against Mutual of
Omaha for breach of the lease agreement and the verified complaint was signed on April 8, 1982.
On April 9, 1982 Intermountain Associated Marketing
requested a lease for a substantial portion (Exhibit 31P) of the
space previously occupied by Mutual of Omaha.

On June 30, 1982

Intermountain Marketing agreed to lease the remaining portion of
the premises taken up by Mutual of Omaha (Exhibit 30P). In
November, 1982 Intermountain Marketing vacated the premises and
declared bankruptcy (R. 614).
The suit for the breach of the lease agreement was tried
before the Honorable Peter F. Leary on July 18, 19 and 20, 1983
and the Court found after hearing all the evidence and listening
to the tapes of the noise that all of the complained of problems
of Mutual of Omaha were without merit and did not amount to a
constructive eviction (R. 354, 355). The Court awarded plaintiffs damages for breach of lease agreement in the amount of
$26,884.23 plus Judgment for the remaining payments due under
the lease.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THAT TENANT MUTUAL
OF OMAHA'S ALLEGED PROBLEMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT, THE
COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF A
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION.
A.

This Court should not overturn the trial court's

finding that no constructive eviction occurred where
the court's findings were based on reasonable and
substantial evidence.
The case of Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (Utah 1982)
is directly on point and provides the applicable law for the
case at bar.

In that case the Court held that tenants were not

constructively evicted from premises leased for the purpose of
running a restaurant.

Defendants claimed that the noise

emanating from a disco below the restaurant as well as lack of
maintenance and other associated problems which caused the
restaurant to shut down one weekend were grounds for constructive eviction.

In that case, defendants entered a ten year

lease with plaintiffs for the second floor of plaintifffs
building.

Some four months after defendants moved into the

building, a disco was allowed to move into the building directly
below defendants.

Defendants complained to the owners that the

loud disco music interfered with their business as well as
attracting undesirable people.

Defendants also complained a

sewer problems and of leaks in roofs or holes in walls.
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The fan

i

in the kitchen also broke requiring the restaurant to be closed
over the weekend.

The defendants then quit the premises,

claiming they had been constructively evicted from the premises
as a result of the disco noise, the lack of maintenance and the
associated problems.
The case was tried to a judge sitting without jury and
the court held no constructive eviction occurred.

This Court

confirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that where
competent evidence exists that the landlord or person under his
control did not render premises or part thereof unsuitable for
its intended purpose, a constructive eviction does not exist.
This Court also explained that the evidence must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the finding of a trier of fact.
In the Brugger case, the main concern of the tenant
claiming a constructive eviction was the noise, the disco in the
basement, emanating from an adjacent tenant.

Id., at 648.

Likewise, Mutual of Omaha's primary concern was the noise
emanating from Intermountain Marketing (R. 487). In the Brugger
case, the Court found that disco was a disturbance but the noise
had a limited effect on defendants' operation.

Under the facts

of this case, the Court found the noise made by Intermountain
Marketing was distracting, but stated specifically that it was
not of sufficient magnitude to warrant abandonment of the leased
premises (R. 279) or otherwise make the premises unsuitable for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the purpose for which they were leased (Finding of Fact No. 5,
R. 354). The Court further found in the case at bar that no
evidence was presented that as a result of the noise or other
alleged culative act, plaintiffs caused defendants any loss of
business or damages (R. 279-80, Findings of Fact 7 and 8, R.
355).
In the Brugger case defendants complained of, in addition to noise, children being in the halls and maintenance
problems which were significant enough to require the business
to have been shut down over a weekend.

Likewise, Mutual of

Omaha complained of people in the halls and maintenance problems.
Moreover, in Brugger, the defendants remained in possession of the premises for 8 months after complaining of the
noise and physical problems.

In the case at bar, Mutual of

Omaha complained of problems with the office building almost
daily from the day they moved in (R. 441). These complaints
were confirmed on June 10, 1981 by letter of Mr. Diaz indicating
specific problems with the noise (R. 530). Like the complained
of problems in Brugger, Mutual of Omaha waited a lengthy period,
in this case fifteen months, before breaching its lease.
In Brugger v. Fonoti, this court was asked to overturn
the findings of the trial judge.

This court specifically held

that the Court would review the evidence in light most favorable
to plaintiffs that unless the evidence was so clear and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

persuasive that all reasonable minds would necessarily conclude
otherwise that it would uphold the trial court's findings.

The

Court stated:
It is a well established rule that the Court will review
the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom
most favorable to the findings of the triers of fact.
Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965).
Id. at 648.

{

In the case at bar defendants are requesting precisely
what the appellant sought in the Brugger case, that is to
overturn the trial judge's findings of fact that a constructive
eviction did not exist.

In this instance, the trial court's

findings are well documented.

Mutual of Omaha asserts that the

real problem is the problem with the noise.

(R. 555) • Mutual

of Omaha admits that they can attest to only 19 occurrences of
noise since June 1981 (R. 133-138, 210, 561). These occurrences

{

lasted approximately 12 seconds (R. 604, 605). Moreover, the
Reids took precautions to prevent any problems from occurring
(R. 445, 451,455, 456, 461-466, 763, 770-776).

Mutual of Omaha

indicated that the noise had indeed ceased as of the end of
December, 1982 (Exhibit 25D, R. 695-697).
Likewise the other problems, parking problems, problems
with people in the hall, and maintenance problems had all
resolved themselves after the attempts by Reids to solve the
problems (R. 770-776).

Plaintiff by his own admission, admits

that the janitorial problems were remedied (R. 554, 555).
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(

Intermountain Marketing indicates that the halls were cleared,
and those problems associated with blocking the halls were
alleviated (R. 770-776).

Under these facts, the trial judge

clearly had evidence upon which he could make a decision.

These

facts taken in light most favorable to plaintiffs as required by
law, require that the holding of the trial court should be
upheld.

See Also, Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d

570 (1965); Thirteenth and Washington STS Corp. v. Neslen, 123
Utah 70, 254 P.2d 847 (1953).
B.

Normal problems encountered in buildings which are

remedied within a reasonable time do not amount to a
constructive eviction.
Mutual of Omaha's complaints as outlined above are
merely ordinary complaints which may be encountered in any
building.

Where these complaints are acted upon and remedied by

the landlord within a reasonable period of time, they do not
amount to a constructive eviction.

This court stated in Brugger

v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (1982):
. . . where the maintenance problems were remedied
within a reasonable time, constructive eviction does not
occur . . . Defendants1 basic complaints were that the
toilet overflowed a couple of times, the roof leaked,
and an exhaust fan failed when they were closed for a
few days. These appear to be nothing other than the
normal problems encountered with most any building, and
were each taken care of as soon as reasonably possible.
Id. at 648 (emphasis in original)
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In the case at bar the alleged problems are normal
problems encountered in most any building and were remedied
<

within a reasonable time.

Accordingly, a constructive eviction

did not exist,
C. Where tenant Mutual of Omaha did not abandon the
premises within a reasonable amount of time
constructive eviction did not occur.
In Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (Utah 1982) citing
Thirteen and Washington STS Corp. v. Neslen, 123 Utah 70, 254
P.2d 847 (1953), the Court found that where defendants did not
leave the premises after complaining of problems until after 8
months, the constructive eviction did not exist.

The court

stated:
Tenant must, however, abandon the premises within a
reasonable time after the alleged interference. _Id. at
648.
In the case at bar, Mutual of Omaha began to claim problems
almost immediately upon entering the building.
remained in the building for 16 months.

However, it

Even after providing

the Reids a formal notice of complaint of the noise in June of
1980, it still remained in the building 8 months before vacating
the premises.

This is analogous to the facts situation in

Brugger which the court found to be an unreasonable amount of
time.

Accordingly, this Court should uphold the trial court's

decision which found that a constructive eviction did not occur.
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D.

Where plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, did not

interfere with tenant, Mutual of Omaha, and where the
complained of acts do not render the premises unsuitable
to conduct business, a constructive eviction has not
occurred.
The court in Brugger stated specifically that in order
for a constructive eviction to occur, the landlord or someone
under his control must interfere with the enjoyment of the
leased premises and render those premises unsuitable for the
purpose for which they are intended.

The Court specifically

enunciated the standard required for constructive eviction:
Construction eviction occurs where tenant's rights of
possession and enjoyment of the leased premises is
interfered with by the landlord, or person under his
control, as to render the premises, or a part thereof,
unsuitable for the purposes intended. 14. at 648.
In the case at bar, there is no indication that the
premises were rendered unsuitable for the purpose intended.
Mutual of Omaha at all times was able to conduct its selling of
insurance.

In fact, there is no proof of any loss of business

(R. 583). Furthermore, production increased each year over the
previous year while Mutual of Omaha was in the Reid Building (R.
660-665).

There is no testimony that the building was not

suitable as office space, the purpose for which it was intended.
The fact that Mutual of Omaha may have had specific
standards for which they required their office space, does not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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render the building unsuitable for the purpose for which it is
intended.
ment.

No specific standard is required by the lease agree-

The standard for determining whether constructive evic-

tion exists as outlined in Brugger v. Fonoti, and Thirteenth and
Washington STS Corp. v. Neslen is an objective test.

The

premises must be rendered unsuitable for the intended purpose by
a reasonable person.

Other courts have likewise imposed a

"reasonable person11 objective standard.

In Gottdiener v.

Mailhot, 431 A.2d 851 (N.J. Super. 1981), a case dealing with a
constructive eviction of a residential tenant, the court stated:
The test is objective, the noise or disruptive conduct
"must be such as truly to render the premises uninhabitable in the eyes of a reasonable person." Id., at 854.
In the case at bar, the trier of fact determined that a
reasonable person would not find that the premises were unsuitable for the purpose intended (Finding of Fact No. 5, R. 354),
Mutual of Omaha's standard is therefore irrelevant.

The weight

of the evidence indicates that the Reid Building was suitable as
office space.
Furthermore, the main concern of Mutual of Omaha was the
noise emanating from Intermountain Marketing (R. 555). In this
instance, the noise was not created by the landlord nor did the
landlord's have control over the activities of the adjacent
tenant, Intermountain Marketing (R. 481). If the noise and
alleged problems are created by Intermountain Marketing, then
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were required to go through the barber shop and shoe shine stand
in order to get to the elevator.

The stairway was also blocked

off.
Furthermore, in that case, the defendants also experienced difficulty with the hours the building remained open.

The

doors were locked at 8:00 p.m. each evening and on holidays
while the lease provisions provided for the building to be open
until 12:00 p.m.

No elevator service was provided after 8:00

p.m. and tenants were required to use a stairway which was not
lit and which was used as a ,!latrine.11

Moreover, there was a

lack of heat in the building and improper ventilation and
continually foul smelling soap, towels and other essentials for
the barber shop made the premises unacceptable as an office
building.

Under these conditions the trial judge determined

that a constructive evictions existed.

However, the factual

allegations of Thirteenth and Washington STS Corp. case and the
case at bar are readily distinguishable.

In that case the court

found the tenants1 complaints were substantial and taken in
total, prevented tenant from using the building for the purpose
for which it was rented.

In this instance, the trial court

properly held that all of the alleged complaints of Mutual of
Omaha were without merit and did not render the premises unsuitable for the purpose for which it was intended.
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POINT II
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT HAS A REASONABLE OR SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDINGS,
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE AND COMPEL A CONTRARY FINDING.
A.

The trial court's refusal to make certain findings

of fact is based on a reasonable or substantial basis in
evidence.
Mutual of Omaha argues that the trial court failed to
make specific findings on pertinent issues before the Court.
The standard where the trier of fact has refused to make a
finding is outlined in the case of Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah
2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972).

In that case, plaintiff sought to

recover damages caused to their home by irrigation water.
Defendant made a motion to dismiss and the court made findings
and entered judgment.

Appellants sought to have the judgment

overturned because the court did not make a finding of fact as
to the negligence.

The court held that in order for appellant

to prevail, there must be a finding of fact to negligence and
determined that under the facts of the case a reasonable man
could have concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove
negligence.

The court stated specifically that no finding of

fact need be made unless the evidence is so clear that all
reasonable minds would conclude in favor of the finding of fact.
...where the fact trier has not been convinced, and has
refused to make a finding essential to the appellant's
cause, this Court x^ill not reverse and compel such a
finding
unless
evidence
is
and pervasive
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that all reasonable minds would necessarily so conclude.
Id. at 141.
In the case at bar, Mutual of Omaha attempts to allege
certain complaints which it claims constitute constructive
eviction.

Mutual of Omaha contends that direct evidence rebut-

ting the statements of defendants was not presented.

However,

direct rebuttal evidence was not necessary for the court to make
its finding as defendants1 own statements minimizing the alleged
problems or statements by other individuals disclaiming the
alleged problems or declaring the problems had been solved were
sufficient to controvert the evidence and testimony of defendants.

Under these circumstances, based on a reasonable or

substantial basis in evidence, the court properly omitted any
finding of fact dealing with a constructive eviction.
Defendants assert that failure to make findings on all
material issues constitutes reversal error and cites three Utah
cases.

A careful reading of these cases, Remel v. ZionTs First

National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980); Boyer Company v.
Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977); Gaddis Investment Company v.
Morrison, 30 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 (1954) indicates that none
of these cases were reversed.

The court in each instance

remanded to the trial court for further findings.

Accordingly,

even if findings were not made all that is mandated is a remand
for further findings.

A reversal would be improper under the

circumstances.
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B.

A mixture of conclusionary findings mixed with

findings of ultimate facts, does not create reversible
error.
The applicable law in this instance is stated by The New
Mexico Supreme Court in the case of In the Matter of the Estate
of Hilton, 98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488 (1982), involving the
contesting of a will.

The court stated specifically that the

mixing of conclusionary facts and ultimate facts would not
create reversal error.
Ultimate facts and conclusions of law are often indistinguishable, and their intermixture in the court's
decision as written does not create reversal error where
fair construction then justifies the court's judgment.
Id. at 491.
Even if there were a mixture of ultimate facts and
conclusiary law, in this instance these findings justify the
court's judgment and would not amount to reversal error.
POINT III
ELECTION OF REMEDIES IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
Initially, respondents have no argument with appellants'
characterization of election of remedies other than the fact
that it is not applicable in the case at bar.

Mutual of Omaha

correctly points out that the doctrine of election of remedies
applies to bar two actions which are inconsistent, generally
based on incompatible facts.

In the case at bar, the Reids did

not pursue two inconsistent remedies.

The remedies which the
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Reids pursued were clear from the outset of the dispute between
the parties.

In their letter of December 4, 1981 the Reids

clearly indicated that Mutual of Omaha would be held liable for
the entire rent obligation as well as attorney's fees in that it
would seek strict compliance with the obligations required in
the lease (Ex. 33P). The Reids then filed their complaint which
clearly expressed the causes of action for damages resulting
from breach of the lease agreement, including past due rents as
well as future rents (R. 2-8). The Amended Complaint likewise
addressed the exact same issues and exact same causes of action
(R. 107-126).

Defendants were at all times aware that the lease

agreement was in effect and that plaintiffs sought to hold
defendants for the entire rental balance due under the terms of
the lease provision.
Under the terms of the lease provision, an election to
terminate the lease need not be made and plaintiffs may pursue
damages under the terms of the lease.

The lease provision

specifically states that plaintiffs may recover from defendants
the amount by which the rent reserved exceeds the amount paid as
rent by reletting (Ex. 1, Lease Agreement para. 19). The
paragraph further provides that in the event the landlord does
not collect rent from the new tenant, such deficiency shall be
calculated and paid monthly by tenant (Ex. 1, Lease Agreement
para. 19).
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Under these circumstances, it is clear that the court is
not dealing with inconsistent or incompatible facts as described
in Farmers and Merchant Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. , 4
Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955).

The remedies sought by

plaintiffs-respondents are for damages for breach of the lease
obligation as defined by paragraph 18 of the lease betx^een the
parties.

Plaintiffs-respondents have neither expressly, nor by

their actions, sought to terminate the lease agreement.
Furthermore, the court has determined that the remedy
which the Reids pursued was clear from the pleadings and the
record.

No termination existed either expressly or impliedly

(Conclusions of Law, R. 360) and no such evidence of a termination was presented (R. 279). The court also implied, by denying
Mutual of Omaha's motion for election of remedies, that an
election of remedies was not appropriate or mandated in this
action (R. 279). Moreover, defendants do not suggest that they
have been prejudiced by the Court failing to rule on their
motion.

Defendants1 evidence would have been no different had

the court required an election from the outset.

The question of

constructive eviction was independent from the question of
damages and Mutual of Omaha was allowed to present all of its
evidence.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS, MERVIN AND ETHNA REID, AND AGAINST MUTUAL OF
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A.

Mervin and Ethna Reids1 actions in mitigating

damages after the abandonment of tenant Mutual of
Omaha was proper under the terms of the lease
agreement and principles of common law and did
not constitute an acceptance of the abandonment.
The appropriate law to be applied in this instance is
best enunciated in the case of Noce v. Stemen, 77 N.M. 71, 419
P.2d 450 (1966).

The court dealt with an action by landlord to

recover rents due under a written lease and for damages to the
leased premises.

Tenants claimed that the lease had been

terminated by operation of law when plaintiffs entered the
leased premises and attempted to procure a new tenant.

The

court held that when a tenant abandons the premises, landlord
may rent the leased premises and the tenant would remain liable
for any rents due for the unexpired term.

The court in that

case stated specifically that:
"but even had the appellees attempted to procure a new
tenant, this act would not necessarily constitute an
acceptance of appellants1 surrender, depending upon the
lessor's intent, either express or implied . . ." In
Hughes v. Porterfield, . . . it was recognized that a
landlord may rent the leased premises on behalf of the
tenant, the tenant remains liable for any rents due for
the unexpired term. See also, McAdam, Landlord and
Tenant, (5th Edition) 1 322; Tiffany, Real Property,
supra; and 3A Thompson Real Property, supra Id. at 451.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs1, Mervin and Ethna Reid,
clear intent was to hold Mutual of Omaha liable for the entire
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rents due under the lease. Mervin and Ethna Reid cited in their
letter to Mutual of Omaha that they intended to hold Mutual of
Omaha to the entire lease payments (Ex. 33P). Immediately after
the abandonment, Mervin and Ethna Reid filed suit seeking the
unpaid rents for the unexpired term.
Moreover, plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, were merely
seeking to enforce their remedies as provided for under the
lease which provides that plaintiffs may re-enter the property,
release the premises and hold defendants liable for the entire
rental amount due and owing (Lease Agreement 1f 19, Ex. 1).
Mutual of Omaha, at all times knew that no termination
had occurred.

Even up to the date of trial, Mutual of Omaha,

requested that plaintiffs elect whether it planned to terminate
the lease (R. 398,399).

The lease agreement specifically

provided that should lessors, Mervin and Ethna Reid, attempt to
terminate the lease, notice was required to be given by the
lessor (Lease Agreement 1f 19, Ex. 1). In this case, no notice
was ever provided (R. 279).
Not only did the act of re-entry and an attempt to lease
the premises not constitute termination, but re-entry and
remodeling were expressly provided for in the lease agreement
(Lease Agreement 1f 19, Ex. 1). The lease provision specifically
provided that remodeling and reletting would not constitute a
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termination but were allowed for under the terms of the lease
(Lease Agreement «,[ 19, Ex, 1).
Under these circumstances, the trial court properly held
that no termination occurred (R. 360),
Mervin and Ethna Reid at the time of the abandonment of
the premises were in a precarious position.

They were subject

to a common law duty to mitigate even where the rental or lease
agreement specifically states no mitigation of damages is
required in the event of a breach, Ross v. Smigelski, 166 N.W.2d
243 (Wis, 1969).

Under these circumstances plaintiffs, in order

to attempt to mitigate damages was under a duty to relet.

It

would be extremely inequitable and unjust under the circumstances to now penalize plaintiffs for attempting to mitigate
damages by declaring a termination.

The better ruling is that

of the trial court that no termination occurred since plaintiffs
were merely following the procedure as outlined in the lease and
clearly enunciated their intent to bind Mutual of Omaha to the
entire unexpired rent.
Defendant Mutual of Omaha cites certain cases in which
it attempts to establish the position that an abandonment releases the lessee from the duty to pay rent.

Although, tenants

are relieved from liability to pay rent where they abandon the
premises and landlord accepts the abandonment, this is not the
case where the abandonment is not accepted by the landlord.
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Otherwise, no lease would be of any validity since all tenant
would have to do is abandon the property to rid itself of any
lease obligations.

The proper point of law is stated in the

case of Roosen v. Schaffer, 127 Ariz. 346, 621 P.2d 33 (Ariz.
App. 1980) where the court addressed the problem of abandonment
of the tenant and reletting by the landlord.

In that case

lessor brought suit against lessee seeking unpaid rents accrued
prior to his reletting of the premises and the balance of rent
owing under the first lease.

Defendant attempted to defend by

stating that a surrender absolved him from any liability of
paying rent.

The court in that case properly held that lessor

who refuses to accept surrender of the lease may recover the
unpaid rent due prior to reletting the premises and future rents
due under the balance of the lease subject to duty to mitigate
damages by making reasonable effort to relet the premises.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid,
had no choice but to mitigate damages.

Where plaintiffs clearly

followed the lease provisions and notified Mutual of Omaha of
their intent to hold them to all future rents, plaintiffs,
Mervin and Ethna Reidsf, actions should not be construed as an
abandonment.
B.

In Utah the question of whether or not there has

been an abandonment of a lease and an acceptance is a
question of fact.
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The appropriate law is cited in John C. Cutler Association v. De Jay Stores, 3 Ut.2d 107, 279 P.2d 700 (1955), where
-I

the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The question of surrender, being generally one of fact
as to what was the intention of the parties, needs to be
determined from all of the attendant circumstances,
including the conduct and expression of the party. The
defendant De Jay having prevailed, is entitled to have
us view the evidence and every fair instance and intendment arising therefrom in the light most favorable to
it. And if, when so regarded, there is any substantial
evidence, or as sometimes stated, any reasonable basis
in the evidence, to support the finding made by the
trial court, it will not be disturbed. ^Ed. at 703.

<

{

In the case at bar there is clearly reasonable basis in
evidence to support the finding.

Plaintiffs wrote letters to

defendants, the lease agreement provides for the remedy plaintiffs exercised without a finding of abandonment and plaintiffs
filed lawsuit immediately after the abandonment asking for the
damages it sought (See Novack v. Fontaine Furniture Company, 146
A. 2d 525, 536 (N.H. 1929) holding that the filing of a lawsuit
for breach of lease serves as notice of intention to hold the
lessee to the terms of the lease.)

Under these circumstances,

reasonable evidence suggests that plaintiffs did not surrender
or abandon the property.
C.

The trial court properly awarded damages of rental

due under the balance of the lease.
In Roosen v. Schaffer, 127 Ariz. 346, 621 P. 2d 33
(Ariz. App. 1980), lessor brought suit against lessee for breach
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of the lease agreement seeking unpaid rent accrued prior to the
reletting of the premises and the balance of rent owing under
the lease.

In that case, the lease provision provided specif-

ically that lessor would have the right to remedies of accepting
both rents past due and future rents.

In that case plaintiff

was allowed by the lease provision to recover for rents past
due.

However, recovery of unpaid future rent had not been

specified under the lease as an available remedy.

The court

held because the lease provision provided for remedies in
addition to those provided by law, the plaintiff was entitled to
both the common law remedy of future rents as well as remedy
provided for past due rents under the lease.

Accordingly,

plaintiff was awarded both past due rents and future rents.
The court stated specifically that:
the lessor may recover the unpaid rent to prior to
reletting the premises and the future rent due under the
balance of the lease, subject to the duty to mitigate
the damages by reletting the premises. ]A. at 36.
In the case at bar, the lease agreement provides for the
specific measure of damages.

The lease agreement provides for

damages of the costs of reletting plus the rent due under the
lease provision minus any amounts received in rent from reletting.

Like the Roosen case, Mervin and Ethna Reid are seeking a

remedy for damages as provided for under the lease agreement and
which is consistent with common law.

In this instance only the
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remedy they seek will provide them with the benefit of their
bargain in entering into the lease with Mutual of Omaha.
I

The facts indicate that plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna
Reid, expended over $10,000.00 in providing excellent, firstrate office space for Mutual of Omaha.

In order to recoup their

expenses, the Reids are entitled to collect rentals for the
entire 5-year lease period.

Only by being insured of their

rental would Mervin and Ethna Reid receive the benefit of their
bargain.

By allowing them their past due rents, future rents,

plus costs of reletting minus any sums received by new tenants,
Mervin and Ethna Reid are merely being insured the benefit of
their bargain during the lease period, i.e., a guaranty of the
amount they would have received had Mutual of Omaha stayed in
the building the full five years.

Anything less would deprive

them of the benefit of their bargain.
Should Mervin and Ethna Reid be relegated to accept only
rents from the time of Judgment, they would be required to
accept the risk of the poor rental market.

If they were not

given the costs of reletting, they would receive less than what
they would have received had Mutual of Omaha stayed in the
premises.

The Reids should be entitled to the exact benefit

they would have had had Mutual of Omaha not left the premises.
The Reids are merely seeking to enforce the terms of the lease
agreement.
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Defendant-appellant wrongly asserts that plaintiffs are
seeking future damages.

They are merely seeking the remedy

provided for under the lease agreement, that is, the amount the
rent reserved for the period of reletting exceeds the amount
paid by the new tenant on a monthly basis.

Paragraph 19 of the

lease states:
11

[LJandlord may take possession pursuant to this lease
and relet said premises or any part thereof for term or
terms (which may be for a term extended beyond the terms
of this lease) and if such rental or rentals and upon
such other terms and conditions as landlord in the
exercise of landlord's sole discretion may deem advisable with the right to make alterations and repairs to
said premises. Upon each such reletting, tenant shall
be immediately liable for and shall pay to landlord, in
addition to any indebtedness due hereunder, the costs
and expenses of such reletting due hereunder, the costs
and expenses of such reletting including advertising
costs, brokerage fees, and reasonable attorney's fees
incurred and the cost of such alteration and repairs
incurred by landlord and the amount, if any, which the
rent reserved in this lease for the period of such
reletting (up to but not beyond the term of this lease)
exceeds the amount agreed to be paid as rent for the
premises for said period by such reletting. If tenant
has been credited with any rents to be received by such
reletting and such rents shall not be promptly paid to
landlord by the new tenant, such deficiencies shall be
calculated and paid monthly by tenant. Ho such re-entry
or taking possession of the premises by landlord shall
be construed as an election by the landlord to terminate
this lease unless the termination thereof by decree by a
court of competent jurisdiction or stated specifically
by the landlord in writing addressed to tenants.!f
(Lease Agreement U19, Ex. 1).
Under the provisions of the lease agreement, Plaintiffs
are not entitled to all future rents in one lump sum.

Rather,

plaintiffs are entitled to a month to month guaranty that they
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will receive the rental due under the lease agreement.

Thus,

the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs an award of a
i

monthly rental amount minus any amounts they are able to collect
in mitigation.
Only in this way may plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid,
receive the benefit of their bargain.

Defendants contest

that the proper measure of damages is the difference between the
value of the rent reserved and the present fair market value of
the remainder, and that the two are presumed to be the same.
However, in the case at bar, plaintiffs presented evidence that
they were not able to obtain a tenant for over 8 months, that
they had not obtained a tenant at the time of the trial and that
the market was experiencing difficulty in the area where
plaintiff's building exists (R. 357, 358). Under these
circumstances the presumption has been rebutted and the fair
rental value cannot be determined to be the market value.
Moreover, in this instance, the damages were agreed upon
by the parties as outlined in the lease agreement.

Accordingly,

these provisions should take precedence and damages should be
determined by the lease agreement.

C D . Stimson Co. v. Porter,

195 F.2d 410, 413 (10th Cir. 1952).
D. Future rents are a proper measure of damages.
In Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Associates, plaintiff
sought damages for profits lost due to tenant's breach of a
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lease agreement.

That case held that the award of future damage

involving a breach of lease was appropriate.

The court stated

specifically:
The crucial question awarding future damages involving a
breach of the lease which affects the long-term value of
the lease or the lessee's profit making potential is
whether such damages can be ascertained with reasonable
certainty. Li. at 1235.
In the case at bar, the lease provides specifically with
reasonable certainty the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled.
The so called "future damages11 are simply the exact amount of
the rental due minus any mitigation.
ably certain as is possible.

This amount is as reason-

Sixty-six thousand dollars was to

be paid at a rate of $1,100.00 per month.

Although defendants

tried to characterize the damages as future damages, the trial
court awarded only $1,100.00 per month minus any amount received
in mitigation.

This is exactly the remedy provided for in the

lease agreement.

No acceleration was provided for, only a month

to month rental as they accrue.

Therefore, the damages awarded

by the court are not future damages.

But even if they were,

they are ascertainable with reasonable certainty and would be
proper under the holding of the Penelko case.
POINT V
THE CASE AT BAR INVOLVES QUESTIONS OF LAW AND
FACT INTERPRETING THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND DOES
NOT REQUIRE COURT TO REVIEW QUESTIONS OF EQUITY.
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Plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, are merely asking the
court to interpret the agreement and to make findings of fact
pursuant to that agreement.

There are no issues of equity that

need to be determined in plaintiffs' case only issues of fact as
to whether the lease agreement was indeed breached.
Appellants

contend

that their counterclaim for

constructive eviction is somehow a question of equity.
clearly not the case.

This is

What amounts to a constructive eviction

is a question of fact and accordingly a determination of equity
is not required in this instance.
What amounts to a constructive eviction is the question
of fact. Gottdiener v. Mailhot, 431 A.2d 851 (N.J.
Super. 1981).
Accordingly, under the facts of the case at bar, the court is
not required to determine the issues of equity.
CONCLUSION
The trial court had an opportunity to review all the
facts regarding Mutual of Omaha's alleged constructive eviction.
The court even had an opportunity to listen to the noise which
defendants recorded and which they claimed was the major concern
of rendering the space inoperable.

After hearing the rendition

of the complained of noise, the court found that the complaints
of defendants were without merit.

All of the other complaints

involved problems common to any business and all were resolved
by the actions of plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid.

Under the
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circumstances the court is clearly justified in finding that no
constructive eviction occurred.
The trial court then addressed itself to the issue of
damages.

Finding that the parties agreed on specific damage

provisions, the court determined that the only way which Mervin
and Ethna Reid could receive the benefit of the bargain is to
provide them with rentals due and to become due under the lease
minus any money received through mitigation.

Only in this way

will Mervin and Ethna Reid receive the benefit of their bargain
in light of the fact that they clearly did not intend to terminate the lease agreement but rather affirmatively asserted that
they would hold defendants to strict compliance under the terms
of the lease including all rental obligations.
Accordingly, the trial court's determination should be
upheld and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for
an award to plaintiffs of attorney1s fees provided for under the
lease agreement.
Respectfully submitted this fH^

day of May, 1984.

McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE

Reid Tateoka
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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